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Abstract 
 
The effects of stimulus repetition often increase when repetitions are more common (i.e., when 
repeats become more predictable), consistent with the idea that repetition effects reflect 
expectations about the recurrence of recent items. In contrast, the present experiments found a 
surprising pattern in which the compressed subjective duration of repeated items was reduced, 
eliminated, and even reversed when the frequency of repetitions was increased. Experiments 1-4b 
found that this pattern generalized across tasks, durations, and stimulus types; Experiments 5-9 
investigated the mechanisms underlying these effects and suggest that recent exposure produces a 
short-lived contraction of subjective time consistent with a low-level process such as neural fatigue, 
whereas elevating the predictability of a repeat produces a subjective time expansion that may 
result from more efficient perceptual processing. These findings (a) establish the important point 
that first-order repetition and second-order repetition-expectations can have opposing functional 
effects, a possibility that has received little attention in general treatments of repetition effects, (b) 
run contrary to existing accounts of repetition effects in time perception, and suggest that there may 
be no simple mapping between apparent duration and the overall magnitude of the neural 
response, and (c) suggest a framework in which subjective time depends on the interplay between 
bottom-up signal strength and top-down gain control. 
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Time perception: The surprising effects of surprising stimuli 
The way that a stimulus is represented, processed, and evaluated, depends greatly on whether 
it has been encountered in the past. Repetition affects stimulus detection (e.g., Kristjánsson & 
Campana 2010), identification (e.g., Huber, 2008), semantic classification (e.g., Durso & Johnson, 
1979; Scarborough, Cortese, & Scarborough, 1977), memory retrieval (e.g., Jacoby & Whitehouse, 
1990), and affective evaluation (e.g., Zajonc, 1968). Likewise, prior exposure influences the neural 
response to a stimulus, with effects spanning timescales from milliseconds to days (e.g., Grill-
Spector, Henson, & Martin, 2006) and ranging from altered molecular activity at the synapse (e.g., 
Zucker & Regehr, 2002) to changes in the overall activity of cortical networks (e.g., Gotts, Chow, & 
Martin, 2012).  
The present work examines the effects of repetition on the experience of time, and 
demonstrates distinct, opposing effects of prior exposure and higher-order expectations. This 
pattern has important implications for models of timing, for broader debates about the role of 
expectation in cognition, and for the links between neural activity and perceptual experience. 
 
Repetition and expectation 
There are two main views regarding repetition effects. The first is that repetition influences 
processing simply by virtue of prior exposure to the stimulus. That is, repetition effects are a 
“relatively automatic consequence of the bottom-up flow of perceptual information through sensory 
cortex” (Summerfield, Trittschuh, Moni, Mesulan, & Egner, 2008, p.1004). Neurally, such a prior-
exposure effect might arise because neurons which are selective for the repeated item fire less 
because of fatigue (e.g., De Baene & Vogels, 2010) or because the encoding becomes more sparse, 
with fewer neurons needed to represent the stimulus (e.g., Desimone, 1996), accounting for the 
widely-observed reduction in neural response upon repeated presentation of a stimulus (repetition 
suppression; e.g., Grill-Spector et al., 2006).  
An alternative, increasingly popular conception attributes repetition effects to expectations -- 
mental states that reflect prior information about possible or probable future experiences 
(Summerfield & Egner, 2009). Broadly, human cognition is seen as an adaptive Bayesian system 
which optimizes responses in light of previous information about the structure of the environment 
(e.g., J.R. Anderson & Milson, 1989; Chater & Manning, 2006; Shi, Church, & Meck, 2013; 
Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths, & Goodman, 2011). Under this view, the first encounter with a stimulus 
establishes it as something that exists in the environment, a sensory possibility that may be 
encountered in future and which generates an expectation of such an encounter so that the stimulus 
will be detected/identified/classified more efficiently upon its next occurrence. Repetition effects 
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are thus attributed to adaptive changes in processing in light of likely future experience (e.g., J.R. 
Anderson & Milson 1989; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007), with cognitive responses to repeated 
material attuned to environmental repetition contingencies  (J.R. Anderson & Schooler, 1991; R.B. 
Anderson, Tweney, Rivardo, & Duncan, 1997). Neurally, this expectation-based view is found in 
theories which attribute repetition effects to predictive coding (Rao & Ballard, 1999); sensory 
information flows through a processing hierarchy and is met at each stage by back-projected 
predictions from the next stage. Prediction error is gradually “explained away” by successive stages 
of cortical processing, with first-order expectations represented earlier and higher-level expectations 
encoded later (e.g., Friston, 2005; Lee & Mumford, 2003; Wacongne et al., 2011; see Huang & Rao, 
2011, for a recent review), and many neuroscientists have argued that the minimization of 
prediction error is a fundamental principle of brain organization and activity (e.g., Bar, 2009; Huang 
& Rao, 2011; Lee & Mumford, 2003; Friston, 2009; for a wide-ranging discussion of these ideas, see 
Clark, 2013, and the subsequent commentaries). The expectation-based view of repetition effects 
therefore relates to far-ranging conceptualizations of cognitive and neural function.  
 
Disambiguating prior exposure and expectation 
The roles of prior exposure and expectation in repetition effects can be disambiguated by 
varying the likelihood of stimulus repetition. In some environments, novel items are typically 
followed by other novel items and the expectation of repetition should be weak; in other situations, 
a novel item is likely to be repeated in the near future, and the repetition-expectation is high. If 
repetition exerts a low-level effect attributable merely to prior exposure then this effect should be 
independent of second-order expectations about the likelihood of repetition and, ergo, independent 
of the repetition frequency. This prediction is illustrated in the top left panel of Figure 1. However, if 
repetition effects reflect expectations then they should be more pronounced when repetitions are 
more likely, giving the pattern illustrated in the top right panel of Figure 1. 
By varying the repetition rate, neuroscientists and psychologists have found considerable 
evidence for the expectation-based view. In one influential study, Summerfield et al. (2008) had 
participants view pairs of faces where the second image was either the same as the first or different. 
In some blocks, 75% of trials were repeats and only 25% were novel; in other blocks, these 
proportions were reversed such that stimulus repetition was rare. The authors used fMRI to 
measure the size of the neural response in the fusiform face area, and the results are re-plotted in 
the bottom left panel of Figure 1. The difference between repeat and novel trials (the repetition 
suppression effect) is much larger when the repetition rate (rep-rate) is high. The bottom right panel 
of Figure 1 plots similar results from Kovács et al. (2012). 
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These data argue that repetition suppression is a consequence of expectations rather than a 
purely low-level result of prior exposure, and this pattern has been replicated many times using EEG 
(Summerfield, Wyart, Johnen, & de Gardelle, 2011), longer adaptation durations (Larsson & Smith, 
2012), non-face images (Mayrhauser, Bergmann, Crone, & Kronbichler, 2014), and auditory stimuli 
(Andics, Gál, Vicsi, Rudas, & Vidnyánsky, 2013; Todorovic & de Lange, 2012; Todorovic et al., 2011) 
and, for faces, occurs irrespective of whether or not the first and second images occupy the same 
spatial location (Kovács et al., 2012).  
These neural data accord with behavioural studies in which the effects of repetition are 
modulated by repetition rate. For example, the facilitatory effects of prior exposure on perceptual 
identification increase when previously-encountered stimuli are more prevalent in the test set (e.g., 
Jacoby, 1983). Likewise, with clearly-visible primes, semantic priming is stronger when the 
proportion of related primes is high (e.g., Neely, 1991), and similar prime-validity effects have been 
found when masked repetition primes facilitate word naming (Bodner & Masson, 2004), lexical 
decision (Bodner & Masson, 2001), and number judgments (Bodner & Dypvik, 2005). These 
repetition effects have usually been taken to indicate that expectancy-based recruitment of 
recently-encoded experiences facilitates subsequent processing of probable stimuli (but see 
Kinoshita, Forster, & Mozer, 2008).  
A minority of neuroscientific studies have found repetition effects that are independent of 
repetition probability. In particular, Kaliukhovich & Vogels (2011) found no modulation of repetition 
suppression by repetition probability when making electrophysiological recordings from macaque 
inferotemporal cortex, suggesting a “low level”, prior-exposure effect (e.g., due to neural fatigue) 
rather than an expectancy-based reduction in prediction error (see also Kovács, Kaiser, Kaliukhovich, 
Vidnyanánszky, & Vogels, 2013), and recent work suggests that familiarity may be one moderator of 
the expectation effect (Grotheer & Kovács, 2014). Again, these neural data have behavioural 
analogues. For example, the perceptual “priming of pop-out” that occurs for recently-encountered 
visual features seems to reflect the recency of the item rather than expectations based on 
environmental contingencies (e.g., Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994). 
In short, there is considerable evidence in support of a unitary, adaptationist/Bayesian 
framework, wherein the neural and functional consequences of repetition are attributable to top-
down expectations about forthcoming stimuli, although there are some instances of first-order 
effects which are unmodulated by repetition probability. These two possibilities dominate 
neuroscientific and psychological treatments of repetition effects. 
There is, however, a third possibility: prior exposure and expectation could, in principle, exert 
opposing effects. For example, recent exposure to an item might suppress the neural or perceptual 
6 
 
representation of that item, but increasing the probability/expectation of such a repeat might 
enhance the response to the stimulus,  resulting in a repetition effect which is large when repeats 
are rare but which is reduced when repeats are common.  
This possibility has received little attention, and would provide an important refinement to our 
thinking about the nature of repetition effects. As outlined below, temporal perception might be 
one experience for which first-order repetition and second-order repetition-probability act in 
opposition. 
 
The effect of repetition on subjective duration 
The perception of time is influenced by many non-temporal factors (Eagleman, 2008; Matthews 
& Meck, 2014) and the neural and information-processing bases for time perception have been 
extensively studied (see Allman, Teki, Griffiths, & Meck, 2013, and Merchant, Harrington, & Meck, 
2013 for recent reviews). One of the most robust effects is that repeated presentation of a stimulus 
shortens its apparent duration relative to novel or rare items. This is observed when a single 
occurrence of an “oddball” stimulus is inserted after a series of repeated standards (New & Scholl, 
2009; Pariyadath and Eagleman, 2007, 2012; Schindel, Rowlands, & Arnold, 2011; Seifried & Ulrich, 
2010; Tse, Intriligator, Rivest, & Cavanagh, 2004), when there are just two stimuli on each trial and 
the second is either a repeat of the first or a novel item (Matthews, 2011c), and when stimulus 
frequency is varied across trials (Ulrich, Mitschke, & Rammsayer, 2006). Moreover, the first 
presentation in a train of repeated stimuli is judged longer than subsequent occurrences (Rose and 
Summers, 1995). The compressed subjective duration of repeated items applies in both visual and 
auditory modalities (e.g., Kim & McAuley, 2013; Tse et al., 2004) and generalizes across judgment 
tasks (Birngruber, Shröter, & Ulrich, 2014; Tse et al., 2004), which has been taken to indicate a 
“genuine” perceptual distortion rather than a judgment artefact. 
Early theorizing attributed the repetition effect to attentional capture by the unexpected, novel 
item, such that an oddball will seem to last longer than a repeated stimulus because “it triggers an 
increase in perceptual information processing” (Tse et al., 2004, p. 1187). A natural interpretation of 
this proposal is that the information processing rate corresponds to the efficiency with which non-
temporal stimulus features are analysed, but this idea is challenged by the finding that directing 
attention to the non-temporal properties of an item enhances the processing of these features but 
reduces subjective duration. (e.g., Casini & Macar, 1997; Macar, Grondin, & Casini, 1994).  
A second attentional account has been offered by Kim and McAuley (2013). Adopting the 
dynamic attending framework (M.R. Jones & Boltz, 1989; Large & M.R. Jones, 1999) and studying 
auditory oddballs, these authors suggest that the pitch- and temporal relations between oddballs 
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and standards across trials generate expectations about future events, with less expected stimuli 
being detected faster and, correspondingly, having longer apparent durations. 
A third suggestion is that novel stimuli briefly elevate the observer’s arousal, accelerating the 
rate of an internal pacemaker used for interval timing (New & Scholl, 2009; Ulrich et al., 2006). The 
fact that the repetition effect only emerges at durations longer than about 300-ms has been taken as 
evidence for this view (Seifried & Ulrich, 2010), on the basis that it takes some time for the 
pacemaker to speed-up (e.g., Matthews, Stewart, & Wearden, 2011). 
A final proposal is that subjective time is a direct consequence of the size of the neural response 
evoked by the stimulus. Eagleman and Pariyadath (2009) have noted that many manipulations which 
increase subjective duration – including increased intensity/contrast, numerosity, and movement – 
also evoke larger neural responses. They suggest that apparent duration is a positive function of the 
energy expended on encoding the stimulus, and attribute the repetition effect on time perception to 
the repetition suppression that results from predictive coding (see also Matthews, 2011c; Schindel et 
al., 2011). Support for this idea is provided by Noguchi and Kakigi (2006), who found that the onset 
of repeated stimuli evoked smaller responses than non-repeats, and that this difference correlated 
with changes in subjective duration (see also Sadeghi, Pariyadath, Apte, Eagleman, & Cook, 2011, for 
a less direct demonstration, and Matthews et al., in press, for a review of recent work in this area). 
 
Time perception as a candidate for opposing effects of repetition and expectation 
The attention, arousal, and predictive-coding accounts share the assumption that the repetition 
effect in time perception arises because novel or rare stimuli are less expected than repeated items. 
As such, they mirror the more general expectation-based/Bayesian accounts of repetition effects 
described above, and share the prediction that increasing repetition frequency will exacerbate the 
repetition effect such that repeats will have even shorter subjective duration relative to novel, 
unexpected stimuli – the pattern illustrated in the top right of Figure 1 and seen in many studies of 
neural repetition suppression. An alternative possibility, not much discussed in studies of time 
perception but apparent from the foregoing discussion of repetition effects, is that prior exposure 
may compress the subjective duration of repeats in a way which is independent of higher-order 
contingencies. 
There is, however, reason to expect a different pattern. Historically, theoretical treatments of 
time perception have emphasized a central timing system, often conceptualized as a “pacemaker” 
whose pulses are accumulated during stimulus presentation to form the raw units of temporal 
perception (Creelman, 1962; Gibbon, Church, & Meck, 1984; Treisman, 1963; Wearden, 1992; Zakay 
& Block, 1997). However, there has been increasing interest in the idea that there may be multiple 
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“clocks” for timing distinct stimuli (e.g., Buhusi & Meck, 2009) and more generally that timing may at 
least partly depend on localized circuits, with temporal information encoded in the dynamics of 
neural activity in networks which are not dedicated timekeepers (Buonomano & Maas, 2009; Ivry & 
Schlerf, 2008; Mauk & Buonomano, 2004). One possibility is that time perception involves an 
interplay between core mechanisms and local systems (Merchant, Zarco, & Prado, 2008; Merchant 
et al., 2013).  
The idea that timing involves local networks feeding information to central systems raises the 
possibility of distinct effects of “low-level” factors and “top down” influences on time perception. 
Importantly, there is reason to think that low-level consequences of prior exposure (repetition) and  
top-down influences of expectation (making repetitions more probable) may exert opposing effects.  
Regarding low-level effects of prior exposure, recent work has shown that adapting to basic 
visual features leads to spatially-specific duration compression for those features. For example, 
Curran and Benton (2012) found that adapting to a moving dot kinetogram for 30 seconds 
compressed the apparent duration of a stimulus with the same direction of movement presented in 
the same hemifield. Whether such spatially-specific adaptation effects are retinotopic or craniotopic, 
and whether they are cortical or pre-cortical in origin, remains controversial (Bruno, Ng, & Johnston, 
2013; Burr, Tozzi, & Morrone, 2007; Burr, Cicchini, Arrighi, & Morrone, 2011; Johnston, Arnold, & 
Nishida, 2006). Nonetheless, they indicate that recent exposure to a stimulus feature can exert 
relatively “low level” compressive effects on subjective time, perhaps independent of higher-order 
expectations. 
In parallel to this is work suggesting that, contrary to the expectation-based accounts of the 
repetition effect outlined above, increases in the predictability of a repeated stimulus will produce 
an expansion of subjective time. As a general principle, when participants are asked to time a given 
stimulus or activity, the judged duration is typically longer when “executive” processing resources 
are available (see Block, Hancock, & Zakay, 2010, for a meta-analytic review). To the extent that 
predictability allows resources to be directed to timing, expected stimuli may have longer subjective 
duration. As a more specific effect, cuing the sensory modality or spatial location of a to-be-judged 
stimulus lengthens its apparent duration, an effect which becomes more pronounced as cue validity 
increases (e.g., Mattes & Ulrich, 1998), providing a direct demonstration that predictability 
lengthens apparent duration. Generalizing these effects to manipulations of repetition frequency 
suggests that increasing the repetition-rate will render the identity of repeated items more 
predictable and, by analogy with modality or spatial cuing, will serve to prolong subjective duration. 
Taken together, these theoretical and empirical developments suggest that time perception 
may demonstrate functionally opposite effects of first- and second-order expectations, with a “low 
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level” prior exposure effect shortening the apparent duration of a repeated item but a “high level” 
expectancy effect that increases the apparent duration of repeats as the repetition-rate increases, 
by virtue of their greater predictability. This possibility stands in contrast to existing accounts of the 
repetition effect in time perception, and to broader theoretical frameworks which attribute the 
neural and functional consequences of repetition to an equivalency between repetition and implicit 
expectation, or which posit low-level effects of prior exposure that are independent of repetition 
probabilities. Such a dissociation would refine theoretical accounts of time perception, and would 
inform broader debates about the functional consequences of prior exposure, expectation, and 
repetition suppression.  
   
The current work 
In the present experiments, participants were presented with pairs of images where the second 
was either a repeat of the first or novel, and where the frequency of repetitions varied between 
blocks of trials. Experiment 1 provides an initial test of whether repetition frequency modulates the 
repetition effect by using a comparison task in which the second image is judged shorter/longer than 
the first. Experiments 2a and 2b generalize the findings to a situation where comparison of the two 
images is not required; Experiment 3 employs a range of longer durations; and Experiments 4a and 
4b use non-face stimuli. To anticipate: contrary to studies of repetition suppression, and contrary to 
extant theoretical accounts of the repetition effect in time perception, repetition exerts a larger 
effect when repetitions are rare. Indeed, the repetition effect was sometimes abolished or even 
reversed when repeats were common, consistent with opposing effects of prior exposure and 
expectation.  
The subsequent experiments explore the mechanisms underlying this pattern. Experiments 5 
and 6 find that the basic repetition effect depends on the inter-stimulus interval and on whether 
stimulus elements are repeated within- or between-stimuli. Experiments 7, 8, and 9 examine the 
mechanisms behind the effects of repetition frequency, first showing that the effect of stimulus 
predictability depends on the way that expectations are manipulated and then examining the effects 
of repetition rate on the latency to detect and semantically classify repeated/novel images, thereby 
providing further clues to the processes underlying the effects of repetition and expectation on the 
perception of time.  
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General Method 
 
In all experiments, two images were presented consecutively on each trial. On repeat trials, the 
second image was identical to the first; on novel trials, it was different. Most experiments 
manipulated the frequency of repetitions: in high rep-rate blocks, the majority of trials were repeats 
and a minority were novel; in low rep-rate blocks, the reverse was true.  
Most experiments used a pool of 622 colour photographs of male and female faces of varying 
ages and ethnicities taken from databases assembled by Burton, White, and McNeill (2010), Ebner 
(2008, who used a subset of images from Minear and Park, 2004, see 
http://agingmind.utdallas.edu/facedb), and O’Toole et al. (2005). The images taken from these 
databases were all forward-looking with nominally neutral expressions, but differed in background 
colour, amount of visible hair, and size; they were edited to be on a white background and of 
approximately equal size (about 300 x 400 pixels).   The images were presented against a white 
background on 17” inch CRT monitors (1024x768 pixels, 85 Hz) viewed through the glass window of 
sound-attenuating chambers from a viewing distance of approximately 80 cm (not fixed). Some 
experiments used non-face photographs. These were a pool of 622 colour photographs selected 
from those used by Matthews (2011c), depicting varied content (nature scenes, machinery, 
furniture, plants, etc) subject to the restriction that none contained a face. These images measured 
343x245 pixels and were presented on a white background. Experiments 5 and 6 used abstract 
stimuli, described below. 
The participants were members of the University of Essex participant panel and were paid £4 
for sessions lasting approximately 30 minutes. Fresh participants were recruited for each experiment 
that used a given stimulus type (faces/non-face photographs/abstract images). Stimulus 
presentation was controlled by DMDX (Forster & Forster, 2003). All presentation times were whole 
numbers of screen refreshes, which explains the slightly odd millisecond values in some cases. 
Manipulating repetition frequency limits the number of trials that provide data for the “rare” 
stimulus type, thereby inflating the number of experimental trials that are required to provide 
sufficient data for each cell of the design. For example, consider a 2 (stimulus type: novel vs repeat) x 
2 (rep-rate: 25% repeats vs 75% repeats) within-subjects experiment. In order to obtain 30 trials for 
the novel stimuli in the high rep-rate condition and for the repeat stimuli in the low rep-rate 
condition, one needs 240 trials and 360 different face stimuli (in all experiments, the same image 
was never repeated across trials). Exploring a range of durations (or levels of some other factor) 
therefore rapidly necessitates a prohibitive number of standardized face images. The approach 
taken in most experiments described here was therefore to concentrate on a single “test” duration 
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but to include a small number of “easy” trials with much shorter/longer durations to ensure that 
participants were motivated to attend to temporal information, and to check that they understood 
the temporal judgment task. Data from these easy trials were only used to ensure 
comprehension/attention and were not part of the main analysis. 
Participant recruitment was based on the sample size needed to obtain approximately 80% 
power (typically higher). Although minimum required sample sizes were fixed in advance of data 
collection, the vagaries of excessive sign-ups/dropouts/participants failing to complete the task etc 
meant that the final sample sizes were not completely pre-determined. In some cases (e.g., the 
preliminary experiment for Experiment 1) the relevant effect size estimates were based on previous 
published work or earlier experiments in the current series; in other cases, a generic “medium” 
effect size (e.g., d = .5) was assumed.   
 
Experiment 1 
 
Experiment 1 provides a first investigation of whether effects of stimulus repetition depend on 
repetition frequency. A preliminary study was conducted in which repetition frequency was held 
constant at 50% throughout the task. This provided a check that the stimuli and task used here 
would replicate the finding that novel images are judged longer than repeats when the two are 
equally likely (e.g., Matthews, 2011c). In the main experiment, participants completed alternating 
blocks of trials with low rep-rate (25% repetitions) and high rep-rate (75% repetitions).  
 
Method 
Participants. The preliminary study used 21 participants (12 female) aged 20-42 (M = 26.4, SD = 
5.7). The main experiment actually involved two sets of participants. In the first instance, 38 
participants were tested. The results were highly surprising, so some weeks later I ran an exact 
replication study to check whether the findings were robust, using 32 new participants (a sample 
size based on a power calculation using the effect size from the first set of participants). The results 
for this replication matched the original findings, so the data are reported here as a single set 
comprising 70 participants (18 male, ages 17-42, M = 22.9, SD = 4.3). 
Design and Procedure. On each trial, participants saw two consecutive faces and judged 
whether the second (the comparison) was presented for more or less time than the first (the 
standard, which was always shown for 506 ms). There were six blocks of trials. Each block comprised 
40 “test” trials (for which the standard and comparison faces had the same duration) and 8 "easy" 
trials, four where the comparison duration was much shorter than the standard (247 ms) and four 
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where it was much longer (1000 ms). Given the typical Weber fraction for time (e.g., Grondin, 2012), 
these short/long durations should be readily discriminable from the 506-ms standard and, as noted 
above, provide a check on comprehension and attention to the task; the primary focus is on the test 
trials.   
In the preliminary experiment, the standard and comparison images were identical for half of 
the trials (repeat trials); for the other half, the comparison face was different from the standard face 
(novel trials). Standard and comparison faces were drawn without replacement from the pool of 622 
face images such that no image was used on more than one trial. Thus, each participant saw a total 
of 288 (trials) x  1.5 (mean number of different faces per trial) = 432 faces. The order of the trials in 
each block was random. The sequence of events on each trial was: a blank interval randomly drawn 
from 882-1118; the standard face; a blank inter-stimulus interval (ISI) for 306 ms; the comparison 
face; blank interval until response (see Fig 2). Participants responded by pressing “S” if they thought 
the duration of comparison image was shorter than the standard and “L” if they thought it was 
longer. Prior to the 6 test blocks participants completed 6 practice trials (one test, one short-easy, 
and one long-easy trial for each of the repeat and novel conditions) using non-facial stimuli. The 
instructions emphasized that the task was difficult and that participants should "go with their 
subjective impression".   
The main experiment was identical except that the 6 blocks alternated between high rep-rate 
and low rep-rate conditions. In the high rep-rate blocks, three quarters of the trials were repeats and 
one quarter were novel; in the low rep-rate blocks the proportions were reversed. Thus, for 
example, there were 10 repeat test trials per low rep-rate block, giving 30 repeat test trials in low 
rep-rate blocks across the whole experiment. Odd-numbered participants started with a low rep-
rate block; even-numbered participants started with a high rep-rate block. 
 
Results  
Preliminary experiment. Two participants were excluded for failing to achieve 80% correct on 
the easy trials (the mean for the remaining participants was 95.3%). The main analysis concerned the 
proportion of “longer” responses for the test trials in each condition. 
The experiment replicated the typical repetition effect: the proportion of “longer” responses for 
novel faces (M = 50.09%, SD = 15.83%) was significantly greater than for repeats (M = 34.65%, SD = 
12.07%), paired-sample t(18) = 4.64, p <.001. Moreover, for the repeat trials the proportion of 
longer responses was significantly below 50%, t(18) = 5.54, p <.001, whereas for the non-repeats it 
was not, t(18) = .02, p = .981. That is, when the comparison image was a repeat of the standard it 
was judged shorter than the standard, but when it was novel it was judged equal to the standard. 
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Main experiment. Five participants were excluded for making more than 20% errors on the 
easy trials (mean error rate for the remaining participants = 3.4%) leaving a sample of 65 (33 who 
started with a low rep-rate block and 32 who started with a high rep-rate-block). 
The mean proportions of “longer” responses for each condition are plotted in the top left panel 
of Figure 3. A 2x2 within-subjects ANOVA confirmed the impression from the figure: novel items 
were, on average, judged longer than repeats, F(1, 64) = 24.15, p <.001, 
2
p  = .27, but this effect was 
modulated by the frequency of stimulus repetitions, F(1,64) = 21.23, p<.001, 
2
p  = .25. There was no 
overall effect of rep-rate, F(1,64) = 1.33, p = .253, 
2
p  = .02. 
The top right panel of Figure 3 shows the effect of novelty vs repetition for the low and high 
rep-rate conditions, and between low vs high repetition rates for novel and repeated stimuli. The 
difference between repeats and novel stimuli was larger when repetitions were rare. Furthermore, 
rep-rate primarily influenced the judgment of repeated items: raising the repetition frequency had 
no significant effect on the judgment of novel faces, but increased the probability of a “longer” 
response to repeats. 
 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 are surprising. The preliminary study and low rep-rate conditions 
replicate the usual finding that novel stimuli are judged longer than repeats. However, when repeats 
were frequent, this effect diminished, primarily because the subjective duration of repeated items 
increased. This effect of repetition rate on subjective time is the opposite of that found in studies of 
repetition suppression, where the reduced neural response to repeated stimuli is exacerbated when 
repetitions are common (compare Figure 3 with the bottom panels of Figure 1).  
Experiment 1 therefore provides an unusual result, and suggests that both prior exposure per se 
and stimulus expectations contribute to the effect of repetition, but with opposing effects. As noted, 
if the repetition effect were purely due to prior exposure, it would not be modulated by repetition 
rate; if it were purely driven by expectations, making the predictable (i.e., repeated) stimuli more 
predictable ought to exaggerate the effect. In fact, the difference between novel and repeated items 
diminished with increasing repetition rate. 
In short, the current pattern is distinct from the two possibilities usually discussed in general 
treatments of repetition effects (i.e., that the effect will be independent of repetition rate, or that 
increased rep-rate will exacerbate the effect; see the top panels of Figure 1), contradicts the 
expectation-based views advanced in time-perception studies, and suggests a dissociation between 
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subjective duration and the overall size of the neural response. The next five experiments sought to 
replicate, clarify, and explore boundary conditions on these findings. 
 
Experiment 2a 
 
Experiment 2 examined whether the surprising results of Experiment 1 generalize to a different 
judgment task. In Experiment 1, participants compared the durations of the first and second image 
on each trial. This may have made the similarity relation between the two images especially salient; 
neuroimaging studies of the effects of rep-rate on repetition suppression have not required this kind 
of explicit comparison (e.g., Summerfield et al., 2008), which might underlie the apparent 
dissociation between the neural-activity data and the present findings. Similarly, the test trials of 
Experiment 1 required a shorter/longer judgment when the comparison was, in fact, equal to the 
standard. This situation of maximal uncertainty increases the effects of non-temporal factors but 
may also encourage the use of judgment heuristics which might be distinct from the purely 
“perceptual” effects of repetition and novelty (e.g., Birngruber et al., 2014; Matthews, 2011c). More 
generally, the linguistic categories “shorter” and “longer” may influence how people construe a 
magnitude comparison (Matthews & Dylman, 2014) and in turn influence their decision rule 
(Birngruber et al., 2014). 
Experiments 2a and 2b therefore used a task which did not require explicit comparison of the 
first and second image, and where participants were free to indicate that repeat and novel images 
were shown for the same duration. Specifically, the stimuli and structure were identical to 
Experiment 1, but participants classified the duration of the second image on each trial as being one 
of 5 durations. 
 
Method 
As before, a preliminary experiment was conducted in which the rep-rate was 50% in all blocks, 
to check whether the new judgment task would replicate the typical finding that repeated images 
are judged shorter than novel ones when both are equiprobable. In the main experiment, rep-rate 
alternated between blocks with exactly the same trial structure as Experiment 1. 
Participants. Eighteen participants completed the preliminary experiment (5 male, aged 19-22, 
M= 20.9, SD = 1.3. Thirty nine participants completed the main experiment (16 male, ages 18-29, M 
= 20.7, SD = 2.5). 
Design and Procedure. The preliminary and main experiments were identical to those of 
Experiment 1, except for the task requirement. Participants classified the second image of each pair 
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as one of 5 durations, labelled 1-5. At the start of the experiments, participants were shown a grey 
square (350 x 350 pixels) for one presentation at 247, 353, 506, 718, and 1000 ms, in order of 
increasing duration, with the durations labelled “Time 1” to “Time 5”. (Each duration was 
approximately 1.4 times longer than the preceding one.) They initiated each exposure with a 
spacebar press in response to a prompt; there was a one second blank screen between the spacebar 
press and the grey square, and a further one second blank after the square had disappeared and 
before the next prompt/instructions appeared.  During the task, participants pressed the number 
keys 1-5 at the top of the keyboard to indicate which of the 5 times the second image had been 
shown for. (Note that only durations 1, 3, and 5 were presented during the experiment, with the 
large majority being #3; it was not expected that participants would accurately memorize the five 
durations; rather, they served to provide a rough set of anchors for a 5-point category-rating scale.)  
 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary study. As in Experiment 1, the 247- and 1000-ms stimuli were only included as 
attention/comprehension checks; all participants judged the 1000-ms stimuli as longer than the 247-
ms stimuli. For the test trials, a paired-t-test showed that the mean category judgment for the novel 
images (2.27, SD = 0.44) was significantly higher than that for repeated images (M = 2.12, SD = 0.42), 
t(17) = 2.25, p = .038. That is, novel stimuli were judged longer than repeats, as before.  
Main experiment. One participant was excluded because their mean judgments for the 1000-
ms stimuli were smaller than those for the 247-ms stimuli, leaving 38 participants (19 with the low 
rep-rate for the first block and 19 with high rep-rate for the first block). 
The mean judgments of the 506-ms faces are plotted in the middle left panel of Figure 3. A 2 x 2 
within-subjects ANOVA revealed no overall effect of rep-rate, F(1,37) = 0.06, p = .804, 
2
p  = .00, but 
a significant overall tendency to judge novel items as longer than repeated ones, F(1,37) = 28.23, 
p<.001, 
2
p  = .43. This tendency which was more pronounced in the low rep-rate blocks, but the 
interaction missed significance, F(1,37) = 3.83, p = .058, 
2
p  = .09.  
 Experiment 2a replicated the qualitative pattern of Experiment 1 in finding that the relative 
expansion of subjective duration for repeated stimuli was reduced when repeats are common, but 
the interaction between the effect of stimulus repetition and repetition frequency was smaller and 
missed significance. Experiment 2b sought to strengthen the effect by having longer runs of trials at 
each rep-rate (Summerfield et al., 2011). Rather than alternating blocks having low and high 
repetition frequency, participants completed three consecutive blocks with a low rep-rate followed 
by three with a high rep-rate, or vice-versa.  
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Experiment 2b 
Method 
Participants. Thirty five participants completed the experiment (6 males, ages 17-29, M = 20.9, 
SD = 2.4), 18 with the low rep-rate trials before the high rep-rate trials and 17 in the reverse order. 
Design and Procedure. The experiment was identical to Experiment 2a except that the three 
blocks with a given rep-rate occurred consecutively. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 The mean judgments of the 506-ms faces are plotted in the bottom left panel of Figure 3. A 
2x2 within-subjects ANOVA confirmed the visual impression: overall, novel items were judged longer 
than repeats, F(1,34) = 15.58, p<.001, 
2
p  = .31, but this effect was qualified by the interaction with 
rep-rate, F(1,34) = 50.98, p<.001, 
2
p  = .60; there was no main effect of rep-rate, F(1,34) = 0.21, p = 
.653, 
2
p  = .01.  
 The contrasts plotted in the bottom right panel of Figure 3 show the effects of repetition at 
each rep-rate and the effect of rep-rate for repeated and novel stimuli. As can be seen from the 95% 
confidence intervals, and replicating the pattern in Experiment 1, novel stimuli were only judged 
longer than repeats when repetitions were rare. Also as in Experiment 1, increasing the frequency of 
repetitions significantly increased the perceived duration of repeat stimuli; in addition, increasing 
the frequency of repetitions significantly reduced the judged duration of novel stimuli, although this 
effect was smaller than the effect on repeated images. 
The change in the block structure from Experiment 1 was intended to increase the size of the 
rep-rate effect. The estimated effect size for the interaction between stimulus type (novel, repeat) 
and rep-rate is indeed much higher than in Experiment 2a, and a cross-experiment comparison lends 
support to this: a 2 (rep-rate) x 2 (stimulus type) x 2 (experiment) mixed ANOVA produced a 
significant three-way interaction, F(1,71) = 12.92, p = .001, 
2
p  = .15 (although there is significant 
inequality in the covariance matrix, so some caution is needed). 
Does the effect of repetition frequency require the participant to have experienced both low- 
and high repetition rates in the experimental session? Analysis of just the first 3 blocks of trials from 
each participant (i.e., those for which the rep-rate is either low or high, with rep-rate now a 
between-subjects factor) suggests not: a 2x2 mixed ANOVA revealed the same pattern as the within-
subjects analysis. That is, novel items were judged longer than repeats, F(1,33) = 12.85, p = .001, 
2
p  
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= .28, and this effect was qualified by rep-rate, F(1,33) = 16.88, p <.001, 
2
p  = .34, with no main 
effect of rep-rate, F(1,33) = 0.07, p = .793, 
2
p  = .00. 
Experiments 2a and 2b replicate the interaction found in Experiment 1: when repetitions are 
common, the difference between the subjective duration of repeated and novel faces is greatly 
reduced. The modulating effect of repetition frequency does not depend on explicit comparison of 
the two images, applies in a judgment task where participants are free to judge the novel and 
repeated stimuli as being the same duration, and applies when rep-rate is varied between-subjects.  
The next experiment examines these effects at a range of longer durations, and employs a 
socially-agreed judgment scale (seconds) which obviates the need to encode a particular standard 
duration.  
 
Experiment 3 
 
Method 
Participants. Forty two participants completed the experiment (17 male, aged 19-45, M = 26.1, 
SD = 6.7); two additional participants were discarded, one because he fell asleep and another 
because she was familiar with the face stimuli, having used some of them in an experiment of her 
own. 
Design and Procedure. On each trial, participants saw two faces which were either identical or 
different. Low rep-rate blocks comprised 12 repeat trials and 36 novel trials; the reverse was true in 
the high rep-rate blocks. Low- and high rep-rate blocks alternated throughout the experiment with 
alternating participants starting with the low/high rep-rate conditions, as in Experiment 1. 
The first image on each trial was shown for 506 ms; the second was shown for one of three 
durations: 906, 1000, or 1094 ms. Each duration was used for one third of the repeat trials and one 
third of the novel trials within each block. Participants judged the duration of the second face on a 
seven point scale ranging from 0.7-1.3 seconds in 0.1 second increments. 
The sequence of events on each trial was:  blank interval for 882-1118 ms; first face for 506 ms; 
blank for 306 ms; second face for 906, 1000, or 1094 ms; blank interval until response. Participants 
indicated their judgment by pressing one of 7 labelled keys along the top of the keyboard. They 
completed a practice set of 6 trials (3 novel and 3 repeat trials at each duration) prior to the main 
task. 
 
Results  
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The mean judgments and standard deviations for each cell of the design are shown in Table 1. A 
3 (duration: 906, 1000, 1094 ms) x 2 (rep-rate: low vs high) x 2 (stimulus type: novel vs repeat) 
within-subjects ANOVA showed that (as one would expect) judgments were larger for faces that 
were presented for longer, F(1.39, 57.16) = 127.12, p <.001, 
2
p  = .76 (Huynh-Feldt correction 
applied). There was no overall difference between repeated and novel faces, F(1,41) = 1.07, p = .306, 
2
p  = .03 and no overall difference between the high rep-rate and low rep-rate blocks, F(1,41) = 0.01, 
p = .926, 
2
p  = .00. However, there was an interaction between stimulus type and the rate of 
repetition, F(1,41) = 5.80, p = .021, 
2
p  = .12. This two-way interaction is illustrated in the left panel 
of Figure 4; the right panel plots the pairwise contrasts. As can be seen from the 95% confidence 
intervals, there was no difference between the subjective duration of novel and repeated faces in 
the low rep-rate blocks, but when repetitions were common, repeated faces were judged to last 
longer than novel ones.  Changes in rep-rate did not significantly change the judged duration of 
either novel or repeated items. 
Neither the interaction between rep-rate and duration nor the three-way interaction with 
stimulus type were significant, F(2,82) = 0.04, p = .962, 
2
p  = .00 and F(2, 82) = 0.02, p = .980, 
2
p  = 
.00, respectively, but there was a two-way interaction between repetition-status and duration, F(2, 
82) = 5.91, p = .004, 
2
p  = .13. The latter arose because repeated stimuli were judged longer than 
novel ones for the 1000-ms duration, t(41) = 2.59, p = .013, but not for the 906-ms or 1094-ms 
stimuli, t(41) = 1.28, p = .209 and t(41) = 1.39, p = .171, respectively. Notably (and like Matthews, 
2011c), this study did not find a steady increase in the repetition effect with increasing duration, 
contrary to the what would be expected if repetition affected the rate of an internal pacemaker.  
 
Discussion 
 Experiment 3 replicated the interaction found in Experiments 1-2b, using longer durations 
and a different judgment task. Experiments 1-2b found longer judgments for novel stimuli when 
repetitions were rare, and this effect diminished or disappeared as repetition rate increased. 
Experiment 3 found no effect of repetition when repetitions were rare, and actually found longer 
subjective duration for repeated stimuli when repetitions were frequent.  In other words, the change 
in duration (or task) has “shifted” the interaction along such that, looking across all experiments, 
there is a cross-over. The finding that immediately repeated stimuli are sometimes judged longer 
than novel ones has not been reported before, and presents a challenge to existing accounts of 
repetition effects. 
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Experiment 4a 
 
In the interests of comparability with studies of repetition suppression (e.g., Kovács et al., 2012; 
Larsson & Smith, 2012; Summerfield et al., 2008; 2011), the foregoing studies all used face stimuli. 
However, faces are “special” in that they have high social significance, activate specific brain 
structures, and are relatively homogenous – all of which might lead to specific effects of prior 
exposure and expectation. Experiment 4a therefore examined whether the effects of repetition rate 
apply for a heterogeneous sample of non-face stimuli. 
 
Method 
Participants. Fifty participants (15 male, ages 18-35, M = 21.5, SD = 3.7) took part.  
Design and Procedure. A pool of 622 non-face images was taken from those used by Matthews 
(2011c). They depicted a wide variety of content (e.g., nature scenes, machinery, furniture, plants) 
subject to the restriction that they did not contain a face. All images measured 343x245 pixels and 
were presented on a white background. A random sample from this pool was used for each 
participant. 
The block structure and stimulus durations were very similar to previous experiments: 
participants completed three blocks in the high rep-rate condition followed by three in the low rep-
rate condition, or vice-versa. Each block comprised 48 pairs of stimuli, 40 where the second image 
was shown for 506 ms, 4 where it was shown for 247 ms, and 4 where it was shown for 1000 ms, 
with 25% of the trials at each duration being of the low frequency type (e.g., repeats in the low rep-
rate blocks, non-repeats in the high rep-rate blocks). Participants indicated whether the second 
image was shown for more or less time than the first, as in Experiment 1. As before, the 247- and 
1000-ms stimuli were purely used to monitor attention/comprehension and were not included in the 
main analysis.  
As well as the change in the stimuli, this experiment introduced some procedural modifications.  
First, each block contained 8 catch trials on which only one image was shown. Participants were 
instructed not to respond on these trials. Second, the ISI was varied by drawing a random number of 
frames from a uniform distribution between 247-753 ms. Third, a warning/fixation cross was 
presented for 247 ms before the first item in each pair, followed by a blank of 353-506 ms. This was 
to avoid confusion following the trials where only one picture was shown (so that participants clearly 
knew when the next trial had begun). Finally, a fixed 2 second window was allowed for responses; 
response collection began at offset of the second image and the next trial began automatically 2 
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seconds later. (On catch trials, response recording began after offset of the first image.) These 
changes were introduced in anticipation of subsequent work examining whether repetition rate 
affects the latency to detect the onset of the second stimulus, described below. The goal was to 
have a task structure which could be used to investigate the perceived duration of the second image 
in each pair (the current experiment), and which could then be used in an onset-detection study 
without changing anything other than the task instructions. 
Thus, the sequence of events on each trial was:  fixation cross for 247 ms; blank for 247-506 ms; 
first image for 506 ms; blank ISI for 247-753 ms; second image for 247, 506, or 1000 ms, or blank 
screen for 506ms (catch trials); blank response window for 2 seconds. 
 
Results  
Six participants were excluded for responding on more than 20% of catch trials, for failing to 
respond on more than 20% of trials where a second image was shown, or for making erroneous 
responses on more than 20% of the “easy” trials. (Means for remaining participants: 3.4% responses 
on catch trials; 3.1% missed responses; 2.4% errors for easy trials.) This left 44 participants, 23 who 
experienced the low rep-rate blocks first, 21 who completed the high rep-rate blocks first. 
The proportions of “longer” responses for the 506-ms test stimuli are plotted in the top left 
panel of Figure 5. The pattern mirrors the face data: novel stimuli were judged longer than repeats, 
F(1,43) = 15.63, p <.001, 
2
p  = .27, there was no overall effect of rep-rate, F(1,43) = 0.47, p = .495, 
2
p  = .01, but rep-rate did modulate the effects of repetition F(1,43) = 6.88, p = .012, 
2
p  = .14. As 
the contrast plot in the top right panel of Figure 5 shows, novel stimuli were judged significantly 
longer than repeats when repeats were rare but not when they were common. Again as in previous 
studies, rep-rate primarily affected the judgment of repeated images, which were judged longer in 
the high rep-rate blocks than in the low rep-rate blocks, whereas repetition frequency did not affect 
the judgment of novel images.   
 
Discussion 
Experiment 4a found that the pattern obtained with face stimuli generalizes to non-face 
images, much as the effects of repetition and repetition rate on neural repetition suppression first 
identified for faces have been generalized to tones and voices (Andics et al., 2013; Todorovic & de 
Lange, 2012). Taken together, these results point to general (but contradictory) effects for the size of 
the neural response and behavioural indices of subjective duration, although without recording 
neural activity during the temporal judgment tasks we must be circumspect about this apparent 
dissociation.  
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The next experiment again used non-face images, and asked whether the foregoing effects 
generalize to a task in which participants attempt to reproduce the target duration by holding down 
a button for the length of time that the picture was visible. Although many studies assume 
equivalence between reproduction and other types of temporal judgment, there is mounting 
evidence for dissociations (e.g., Gil & Droit-Volet, 2011). Most relevantly, Matthews (2011c) found 
that the effects of stimulus repetition in a reproduction task were the opposite of those in 
discrimination/estimation tasks. 
 
Experiment 4b 
 
Method 
Participants. Thirty seven participants completed the experiment (11 male, ages 17-49, M = 
22.6, SD = 6.4). One additional participant reported failing to understand the task and was excluded. 
Design and Procedure. The stimuli were the same non-face images as used in Experiment 4a. 
The sequence of events on each trial was: the first image for 506 ms, a random ISI of 247-753 ms; 
the second image for a randomly chosen interval of 506-1000 ms; a 4 second response window, 
during which participants attempted to hold down the left mouse button for a length of time equal 
to the duration of the second image. The increased time needed for each trial meant that the 
number of trials was reduced to avoid fatigue. Thus, participants completed 6 blocks of 36 trials. In 
the low rep-rate blocks, the two images in each pair were the same for 9 trials and different for 27 
trials; in high rep-rate blocks, these values were swapped. Thus, the “rare” trial type occurred on 
25% of the trials in a block, as in previous experiments. Alternating participants were assigned to 
complete three high rep-rate blocks followed by three low rep-rate blocks, or vice-versa. Participants 
completed six practice trials prior to the main task. 
 
Results 
Trials were excluded if the participant made multiple button presses, started their response 
before offset of the second picture, made no response, used the wrong mouse button, or responded 
outside the response window. Three participants were excluded because these errors comprised 
more than 20% of trials (mean for the remaining participants = 2.1%), leaving a final sample of 34 (17 
who completed the low rep-rate blocks first, 17 who completed the high rep-rate blocks first). 
The constant error (CE, reproduced duration – target duration) was calculated for each trial and 
averaged across trials for each condition (see bottom left panel of Figure 5). The constant error was 
not affected by rep-rate, F(1,33) = 0.14, p = .708, 
2
p  = .00, or stimulus type, F(1,33) = 0.07, p = .793, 
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2
p  = .00, and there was no interaction, F(1,33) = 0.05, p= .823, 
2
p  = .00. The same pattern of non-
significant findings was obtained when mean reproduced duration (rather than constant error) was 
used as the DV. 
As noted above, the current experiments were highly-powered, and the bottom panels of 
Figure 5 indicate very little indication of any effects. Nonetheless, one must be cautious about 
interpreting null results. A reviewer suggested that for this and certain other results that follow, it 
would be worth calculating Bayes factors (BFs) to quantify the evidence in favour of the null (see 
e.g., Gallistel, 2009; Kruschke, 2011; Matthews, 2011d; Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, and Iverson, 
2009, for discussions of this approach). The fully within-subjects design meant that both the main 
effects and the interaction could be reduced to paired t-tests. Rouder et al.’s “Bayesian t-test” gave 
BFs of 5.3 for the main effect of novelty, 5.1 for the main effect of rep-rate, and 5.3 for the 
interaction, meaning that for all tests the data favoured the null by a factor of about five to one. 
(This was with the recently-proposed default scaling factor of r = 0.707 --see Morey, Rouder, and 
Jamil, 2014); using the factor of r = 1.0 originally recommended by Rouder et al., 2009, leads to even 
stronger evidence for the null.)  
 
Discussion 
This experiment adds to a number of studies suggesting differences between tasks that have 
previously been used interchangeably. For example, Gil & Droit-Volet (2011) found that angry faces 
were judged longer than neutral ones in verbal estimation and bisection tasks but not in 
reproduction or generalization tasks (see also Matthews, 2011c). The reason for these dissociations 
is not clear. Reproduction tasks can be complicated by motor-timing effects (Droit-Volet, 2010) 
whereas estimation is a particularly “raw” type of temporal judgment (L.A. Jones, Poliakoff, & Wells 
2009; Wearden, 1999). Reproduction may also involve greater working memory demands than 
simple classification tasks because the observer has to compare the on-going duration of the 
reproduction against the record of the original experience (although classification tasks might 
similarly involve continuously comparing the current duration to a previous sample). I will not 
speculate further about possible reasons for the lack of repetition effects in this study, other than to 
note that the difference between judgment tasks may help to resolve inconsistencies in the effects 
of prior exposure reported in the literature (e.g., compare Witherspoon & Allan, 1985, with Ono & 
Kawahara, 2005). 
Experiments 1-4b demonstrate distinct effects of prior exposure and expectation on subjective 
time: previously-exposed stimuli are judged shorter than novel items when both are equiprobable, 
but making the repeats more predictable increases their apparent duration relative to novel items. 
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The remaining studies probe the basis for these effects. Experiments 5 and 6 examine boundary 
conditions for the effect of prior exposure; Experiments 7a, 7b, 8 and 9 examine the mechanisms 
underlying the effects of repetition frequency/predictability. 
 
Experiment 5 
One basic question regarding the effect of prior exposure is: how long does the effect last? 
Studies of the role of “long term” memory on subjective duration have produced mixed results 
(Matthews, 2011c; Witherspoon & Allan, 1985), but the effect of changes in inter-stimulus interval 
(ISI) when there are no intervening items between the first and second presentations has not 
hitherto been addressed. In neural studies, some tasks and measures find repetition suppression 
that persists for many minutes and over multiple intervening items (see e.g., Grill-Spector et al., 
2006), but at least some of the neural correlates of prior exposure are short-lived -- for example, a 
recent EEG study found that suppression of the N170 response to repeated face stimuli was 
obliterated as the ISI increased from 400 to 2000 ms (Kuehl, Brandt, Hahn, Dettling, & Neuhaus, 
2013). Correspondingly, different mechanisms may underlie short-term and long-lasting suppression 
effects (e.g., De Baene & Vogels, 2010; Gotts et al., 2012), and these may have differing implications 
for time perception.  
Experiment 5 used the same paradigm as the preliminary study for Experiment 1: participants 
judged whether the second image was shown for more or less time than the first, and the repetition 
rate was not varied; half the trials were repeats and half were novel. However, half the trials had the 
same 306-ms ISI as in Experiment 1 and half had a longer 2000-ms ISI. In addition, and in anticipation 
of Experiment 6, the stimuli were changed from photographs to abstract patterns. 
 
Method 
Participants. Thirty six participants (21 female, ages 19-38, M = 24.3, SD = 4.9) took part.  
Stimuli. A set of 75 two-colour icons were constructed by drawing simple, abstract patterns. 
Each measured 100 x 100 pixels. The stimuli were constructed by arranging sub-sets of these icons 
into a 3x3 grid. The first, standard stimulus on each trial was constructed by sampling 9 icons 
without replacement from the set of 75; an example is shown in Figure 6. On repeat trials, the 
second stimulus was the same as the first; on novel trials, the second image was constructed by 
sampling without replacement from the 66 icons not used for the first stimulus. 
Design and Procedure. Participants saw two stimuli and judged whether the second had longer 
or shorter duration than the first. The trial structure and task were the same as for the preliminary 
experiment for Experiment 1; the first image was shown for 506 ms and the second for either 247, 
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506, or 1000 ms. Each block consisted of 48 trials including 8 “easy” trials (4 with the 247-ms 
comparison duration and 4 with the 1000-ms comparison duration); on half of the trials the standard 
and comparison stimuli were the same image and on half they were different.  Trials order was 
randomized and participants indicated their responses by pressing the S and L keys of a standard 
keyboard. 
There were six blocks; half had a short ISI (306-ms) and half had a long ISI (2000 ms). Blocks 
alternated between short- and long-ISIs. Half the participants started with a short-ISI block and half 
with a long-ISI block. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Five participants were excluded for scoring less than 80% correct on the “easy” trials. The data 
for the remaining 31 are plotted in Figure 7. A 2x2 within-subjects ANOVA revealed that, overall, 
novel stimuli were judged longer than repeats, F(1, 30) = 17.29, p <.001, 
2
p = .37. However, this 
effect was modulated by the inter-stimulus interval, F(1,30) = 24.33, p<.001, 
2
p = .45; the ISI had no 
main effect, F(1, 30) = 0.21, p= .651, 
2
p = .01. As can be seen from the contrasts in the right panel of 
Figure 7, stimulus repetition only affected judgements when the ISI was short; when the interval 
between the standard and comparison images was 2000 ms, novel and repeated images were 
judged the same. We return to this finding below. 
 
Experiment 6 
A second potential boundary condition for the effects of prior exposure concerns the need for a 
lag between the occurrences of the elements that make up the stimulus. In oddball tasks and the 
two-stimulus paradigm of Experiments 1-5, repeated presentations of the stimuli are separated in 
time. Yet if the effect of prior exposure is due to novel items being more 
interesting/informative/arousing than repeats (e.g., New & Scholl, 2009; Seifried & Ulrich, 2010; 
Ulrich et al., 2006) then we might expect the same effect when we compare a stimulus composed of 
the same element repeated several times with a stimulus comprising many different features.  
 
Method 
Participants. Forty eight participants (13 male, ages 19-51, M = 25.1, SD = 7.3) took part. 
Stimuli. The stimuli were constructed from the set of 75 icons used Experiment 5.  On each trial, 
10 icons were sampled without replacement. The complex stimulus consisted of 9 of these arranged 
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in a 3x3 grid; the simple stimulus consisted of repeating the remaining icon in the same 3x3 
arrangement.  
Design and Procedure. The task and durations were as in Experiment 5, with 48 trials per block 
comprising 40 test trials and 8 “easy” trials, and a fixed ISI of 306 ms. On half of the trials, the first, 
standard stimulus was simple and the second, comparison stimulus was complex; on the other half 
the order was reversed. Participants judged whether the second item had long or shorter duration 
than the first. Comparison duration and stimulus order were fully crossed in each block, and trial 
order was randomized. 
 
Results and Discussion 
One participant was excluded because he reported that some of the icons had personal 
significance to him; one was excluded for failing to understand the task; three were excluded for 
making erroneous responses on more than 20% of the “easy” trials (mean for final sample = 4.2%), 
leaving a sample of 43 participants. 
For each participant, the proportion of trials on which the second image was judged to have 
longer duration than the first was calculated for both the simple-complex and complex-simple 
stimulus orders. The mean proportion of trials on which the second image was judged longer than 
the first was .530 (SD = .167) for the order simple-complex and .535 (SD = .172) for the order 
complex-simple. This difference was not significant, t(42) = 0.38, p = .707, BF = 5.7 (the data favour 
the null by a factor of 5.7 to 1).  
Experiments 5 and 6 suggest boundary conditions for the repetition effect: the repeated 
presentation of the stimulus elements must be separated in time rather than intra-stimulus 
(Experiment 6), and the effect is short-lived: when the time between first and second presentations 
is extended to 2 seconds, novel and pre-exposed stimuli are judged to have the same duration 
(Experiment 5). We return to these findings in the General Discussion. The remaining experiments 
explore the mechanisms behind the increased subjective duration for predictable repeats elicited by 
an increase in repetition frequency. 
 
Experiment 7 
 
The preceding studies all manipulated stimulus predictability by varying the proportion of 
repeat/novel trials. Experiment 7 investigated whether alternative manipulations of expectation 
produce the same effects. The structure of the task was similar to studies of attention in which pre-
stimulus cues signal the likely location/modality/features of a forthcoming stimulus. Specifically, all 
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blocks contained an equal number of repeat and novel trials, but the images on each trial were 
preceded by cues which either reliably predicted whether the two faces would be identical, or which 
were uninformative.  
In a first experiment, not reported here (full details are available from the author), the cues 
were shapes presented incidentally prior to the face pair. This study found the usual shortening of 
apparent duration for repeated items, but this was completely unaffected by the validity of the cue. 
However, this may have been because of the requirement to learn cue-repetition contingencies over 
the course of the session (participants were given no explicit information as to their significance or 
validity). The current experiment therefore used over-learned verbal cues. 
 
Method 
Participants. Thirty four participants (9 male, ages 18-50, M = 22.0, SD = 6.1) took part.  
Design and Procedure. The trial structure and task were the same as for the preliminary study 
conducted for Experiment 2a: each block of 48 trials comprised an equal mixture of repeat and novel 
trials, 40 at the “test” duration (506 ms) and 4 at each of the two “easy” comprehension/attention 
check durations (247 ms and 1000 ms), and participants classified the duration of the second face in 
each pair as one of five times. 
Participants were told that sometimes the two images shown on each trial would be the same 
and sometimes they would be different. They were also told that a word would flash on the screen 
before each pair of photographs, and that “same” meant the two images would be the same, 
“different” meant that they would be different, whilst “fesa” and “menditref” both meant that the 
images were equally likely to be the same or different. (The uninformative cues were formed by 
swapping two letters from each valid cue and then jumbling the letter order.) Informative and 
uninformative cues were used equally often for each duration in each block, with trial order 
randomized.  
The instructions and practice were generally as in Experiment 2. The practice trials were 
expanded to include one valid and one invalid cue for both repeat and novel trials at each of the 
three durations (247, 506, and 1000 ms). In both the practice trials and main task, the use of “fesa” 
and “menditref” as the invalid cue was randomly determined on each trial. The inclusion of the pre-
cue increased the duration of each trial, so the number of blocks was reduced from 6 to 5. (The fact 
that there is no longer a “rare” stimulus type means that this still gives more trials in each condition 
than in previous experiments.) 
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The sequence of events on each trial was: a blank interval for 882-1000 ms; cue for 353 ms; 
blank interval for 506-753 ms; first face for 506 ms; blank for 306 ms; second face for 247, 506, or 
1000 ms; blank until response. 
 
Results and Discussion 
One participant was excluded because their mean judgments for the 1000-ms stimuli were 
smaller than for the 247-ms stimuli. The mean judgments for each condition are plotted in the left 
panel of Figure 8. A 2x2 within-subjects ANOVA revealed that novel images were judged longer than 
repeats, F(1,32) = 29.71, p<.001, 
2
p  = .48, but there was no main effect of cue validity, F(1,32) = 
0.02, p = .892, 
2
p  = .00, and no validity x repetition interaction, F(1,32) = 0.00, p = .972, 
2
p  = .00. 
The Bayes factors for the cue-validity and interaction effects were 5.3 and 5.4 respectively (i.e., the 
data the favour the null by a factor of just over 5:1 in each case). By contrast, the BF for the the main 
effect of repetition favoured the alternative hypothesis by a factor of more than 3000 to 1.)  
In short, duration judgments are sensitive to variations in repetition frequency but manipulating 
expectations by explicitly signalling the repetition status of forthcoming stimuli does not have the 
same effect as varying the probability of repetition.  
 
Sequential Effects 
 
As an additional exploration of the nature of the expectations that underlie the effects of rep-
rate on time perception, I examined trial-by-trial changes in the subjective duration of repeated and 
novel items. Many studies have shown that attentional processes and perceptual judgments, 
including temporal judgments, exhibit sequential effects, changing contingent upon recent 
experience (e.g., Dyjas, Bausenhart, & Ulrich, 2012; Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994; Matthews & 
Stewart, 2009; Taatgen & van Rijn,2011). One possibility is therefore that the effect of making 
repeats more predictable by increasing the repetition-rate will be paralleled by short-term changes 
in expectation.  
To investigate this, I re-analysed the data from the preliminary and main experiments of 
Experiment 1 (recall that in the preliminary study the repetition probability was a constant 50% 
throughout the experiment). Each trial was classified according to whether the comparison stimulus 
was a repeat or novel, and whether the preceding trial was a repeat-trial or a novel-trial. (Responses 
to the first trial of each block were excluded.) The mean response proportions are plotted in the top-
left panel of Figure 9: the black and white bars indicate responses to novel and repeated items on 
the current trial, grouped according to whether the previous trial was novel (prev-nov) or a repeat 
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(prev-rep). As one would expect, there is a main effect of current trial type, with novel stimuli judged 
longer than repeats, F(1,18) = 19.93, p<.001, 
2
p = 0.53. However, this is modulated by the previous 
trial type, F(1,18) = 14.57, p = .001, 
2
p = .45; as can be seen in the figure, the repetition effect was 
smaller when the previous trial was also a repeat. There was no main effect of previous trial type, 
F(1,18) = 0.25, p = .626, 
2
p = .01.  
The same pattern was found for the main study of Experiment 1. A 2x2x2 within-subjects 
ANOVA revealed (as in the original analysis) that novel stimuli were judged longer than repeats, 
F(1,64) = 27.73, p<.001, 
2
p = .30 and that this effect interacted with rep-rate such that the repetition 
effect was smaller when repeats were common, F(1,64) = 5.13, p = .027, 
2
p = .07. Importantly, the 
effect of repetition was also modulated by the condition on the previous trial, F(1,64) = 13.27, p = 
.001, 
2
p = .17, and this modulation was independent of rep-rate (i.e., the three-way interaction was 
not significant), F(1,64) = 2.13, p = .149, 
2
p = .03. The two-way interaction between current- and 
previous-trial types is plotted in the bottom left panel of Figure 10. [There was no main effect of rep-
rate, F(1,64) = 1.63, p = .207, 
2
p = .02, no main effect of previous trial type, F(1,64) = 0.16, p = .687, 
2
p = .00, and no interaction between these two factors, F(1,64) = 1.35, p = .250, 
2
p = .02.] 
Thus, the effect of “local” repetition rate (whether the previous trial was a repeat or not) 
mirrors the effect of “global” repetition rate (variations in the proportion of repetitions between 
blocks of trials). The data therefore suggest that observers generate expectations about whether the 
pair of items on the next trial will be the same or different based upon their most recent experience. 
I repeated the sequential effects analysis for Experiments 2a and 2b (and the preliminary experiment 
for these studies), Experiment 3, Experiment 4a, and the main and preliminary studies for 
Experiment 7. The relative subjective duration of repeated items was increased following repeat 
trials in 6 of these 7 studies, although the effect was only significant for Experiment 2b.  
 
Experiment 8 
 
The final two experiments investigate the mechanisms underlying the effects of increasing 
repetition frequency. One possibility, discussed by Kim and McAuley (2013), is that predictability 
influences the latency to detect stimulus onset; specifically, these authors found that more 
deviant/unexpected stimuli were both judged longer and detected more rapidly than predictable 
29 
 
items. Experiment 8 examined onset detection times as a function of prior exposure and repetition 
rate.   
 In order to allow the best possible test of whether onset detection underlies the effects of 
repetition and repetition rate on subjective duration, the trial structure and procedure of this study 
were identical to Experiment 4a, where the effects on temporal judgment were clearly established. 
Indeed, Experiment 4a was designed with the possibility of a subsequent onset-detection task in 
mind. For example, that experiment included catch trials on which no second image was presented; 
such trials were intended to discourage anticipatory responding in the onset-detection version of the 
task used here. 
 
Method 
Participants. Fifty two participants took part (18 male, ages 18-32, M = 21.2, SD = 2.5). 
Design and Procedure. The experiment was identical to Experiment 4a, except for the 
instructions given to participants. Participants were told that they should press the H key on the 
keyboard as soon as they saw the second image on each trial. They were warned that responses 
made before the appearance of the second image would not be recorded and that on some trials 
there would be only one image, in which case they should not press anything. 
The original written instructions referred to seeing “pairs of images” on each trial. Feedback 
from two of the first eight participants indicated that they had not understood the task and had only 
been responding when the two images were the same (a “pair”). The written instructions were 
therefore modified for subsequent participants to eliminate all mention of “pairs” (e.g., replacing 
“Your task is to press the H key as soon as the second picture in the pair appears on the screen” with 
“Your task is to press the H key as soon as the second picture appears on the screen. It doesn’t 
matter what the picture is – just press H as soon as you see it”).  
 
Results and Discussion 
Trials with RTs less than 100ms or more than 1000ms were assumed to represent anticipatory 
responses/attentional lapses and were excluded. In addition to the two participants who self-
reported misunderstanding the task, nine participants were excluded for responding on more than 
20% of catch trials or having missing data for more than 20% of the non-catch trials (means for 
remaining participants 3.7% and 2.7%, respectively), leaving a sample of 41 participants, 20 who 
completed the low rep-rate blocks before the high rep-rate blocks and 21 with the reverse order. By 
analogy with the temporal judgment task, analysis was limited to trials where the second image had 
a duration 506 ms (collapsing across all durations produced the same results). 
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The mean response latencies for each condition are plotted in the top left panel of Figure 10. A 
2x2 within-subjects ANOVA showed no overall effect of stimulus repetition, F(1,40) = 1.04, p = .314, 
2
p  = .03,  no overall effect of repetition rate, F(1,40) = 0.51, p = .479, 
2
p  = .01, and no interaction, 
F(1,40) = 0.06, p = .807, 
2
p  = .002. Bayes factors led to the same conclusions, favouring the null for 
all three tests (BFrepetition=3.7, BFrep-rate=4.7, BFinteraction=5.8). 
Experiment 8 therefore found no evidence that repetition or repetition rate affected the time 
taken to detect the onset of the second image on each trial. This runs contrary to the findings of Kim 
and McAuley (2013), although there are many differences between the two studies, including (a) 
their use of auditory stimuli, (b) the fact that each trial of the current experiments used unique 
images whereas Kim and McAuley presented the same stimuli throughout the session, (c) the 
inclusion of catch trials in the current experiments, and (d) Kim and McAuley’s use of an oddball 
paradigm, where the position of the to-be-detected stimulus in the sequence varied from trial to 
trial, whereas the current experiment varied the time between the offset of the first stimulus and 
the onset of the to-be-detected image. Although we cannot rule out any effect of 
repetition/repetition rate on onset detection, the available data suggest that this is not a major 
contributor to the effects found in Experiments 1, 2a, 2b, 3, and 4a.  
 
Experiment 9 
 
Experiment 9 asks whether repetition rate influences “higher-level” stimulus processing (i.e., 
processing that occurs after simple onset detection) by measuring its effect on the time taken to 
classify the test images as male or female. As before, apart from the instructions, the experiment 
was identical to a previous study (Experiment 2b this time) which demonstrated the repetition and 
rep-rate effects on time perception. 
 
Method 
Participants. Twenty seven participants took part (8 male, ages 17-31, M = 21.1., SD = 3.1). 
Design and Procedure. The experiment was identical to Experiment 2b, except that the 
participants’ task was to identify the gender of the second face in each pair as quickly as possible. 
The sequence of events on each trial was therefore: blank interval for 882-1118 ms; first face for 506 
ms; blank ISI for 306 ms; second face for 247, 506, or 1000 ms; blank interval until response. 
Response recording began as soon as the second face appeared on the screen. If a response was 
made while the second image was still visible, the next trial began as soon as presentation was 
complete. 
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Participants indicated the gender of the second face by pressing the “0” and “1” keys on the 
keyboard (assignment of keys to gender was alternated across participants). Participants were told 
to respond as fast as possible whilst maintaining accuracy. 
The pool of 622 faces comprised 290 males and 332 females. However, the actual gender of the 
faces shown on a given trial was not an important factor: the only issue is whether the effect of 
seeing exactly the same face (be it male or female) before the target face affects the time taken to 
classify its gender, and whether this effect is modulated by the frequency with which such 
repetitions occur. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Response times less than 150 ms were judged anticipatory and excluded (this pre-set criterion 
was longer than in Experiment 8 on the assumption that the minimum latency for semantic 
classification will be longer than for onset detection; in practice, the precise choice of criteria makes 
little difference.) Three participants were excluded for making erroneous/missing/anticipatory 
responses on more than 20% of trials, giving 24 useable participants (13 who experienced the low 
rep-rate blocks before the high rep-rate blocks, 11 with the reverse order). In the interests of direct 
comparability with the temporal judgment data of Experiment 2b, we focussed on the responses to 
the target stimuli (i.e., those with 506-ms durations), but the pattern of significant effects was 
identical collapsing across duration (i.e., when the 247- and 1000-ms “easy” items were included). 
The error rates were very similar in all conditions: in the low rep-rate blocks, Mnovel = 5.3% (SD = 
3.0%), Mrep = 5.0% (SD = 4.0%); in the high rep-rate blocks, Mnovel = 5.6% (SD= 5.0%), Mrep = 4.0% (SD 
= 29%). A 2x2 within-subjects ANOVA confirmed that there was no overall difference in the error 
rates for repeat and novel trials,  F(1,23) = 1.22, p = .281, 
2
p  = .05, no main effect of rep-rate, 
F(1,23) = 0.27, p = .606, 
2
p  = .01, and no interaction, F(1,23) = 1.91, p = .180, 
2
p  = .08
1. 
The main focus is on mean correct RTs, which are plotted in the middle left panel of Figure 10. 
Overall, responses were faster when the second image was a repeat than when it was novel, F(1,23) 
= 14.64, p = .001, 
2
p  = .39. There was no main effect of rep-rate, F(1,23) = 1.18, p = .289, 
2
p  = .05, 
but rep-rate did modulate the effects of stimulus repetition, F(1,23) = 14.63, p = .001, 
2
p  = .39. As 
can be seen from the 95% confidence intervals around the contrasts plotted in the middle right 
                                                          
1
  ANOVA may not be appropriate for proportion data with such low values. Fitting a generalized linear model 
with a logit link function using the lme4 package of R (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014) led to the 
same conclusions (95% profile confidence intervals for all three effects spanned zero). Perhaps more 
importantly, the absolute difference between the lowest and highest error rates is only 1.6%, so any effect is 
very small in absolute terms.) 
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panel of Figure 9, responses were faster for repeats when repetitions were common (high rep-rate 
blocks) but not when they were rare (low rep-rate blocks). This difference was driven by a significant 
shortening of reaction times to repeated stimuli in the high rep-rate blocks relative to the low rep-
rate blocks; the responses to novel stimuli were not significantly affected by rep-rate. 
The foregoing leaves open the locus of the RT improvement for repeated items. In particular, 
when repetitions are common the gender of the first face is a valid cue to the response that will be 
required to the target, so the faster RTs may be due to response preparation rather than a change in 
the efficiency with which the target is processed. To explore this possibility, I divided the non-repeat 
trials into those where the target was the same gender as the standard and those where the gender 
was different. If repetition probability shortens RTs for repeated stimuli purely via response priming, 
the effect should generalize to trials where the same response is required even if the identity of the 
face is different.  
The mean RTs for correct responses are plotted in the bottom left panel of Figure 10. A 2 x 3 
ANOVA with rep-rate (low vs high) and repetition condition (different gender, same gender but 
different face, identical face) as within-subject factors revealed a main effect of repetition condition, 
F(1.57, 36.03) = 11.64, p<.001, 
2
p = .34 which was affected by the repetition rate, F(1.60,36.84) = 
8.52, p = .002, 
2
p = .27. There was no overall effect of rep-rate, F(1,23) = 0.32, p = .580, 
2
p = .01. 
(The same patterns were found when the analyses were conducted using trials of all stimulus 
durations rather than just the target durations.) 
As can be seen from the contrast plots in the bottom right panel of Figure 10, increasing the 
repetition rate accelerated responses to identical faces but had no significant effect on responses to 
different faces, whether of the same or a different gender. This suggests that repetition rate affected 
the speed with which perceptual information was extracted from the repeated image; if the faster 
responses to repeated images were purely a response-priming effect, it would be expected to 
generalize to other stimuli that require the same motor output (although there might be a response-
priming effect which is cancelled as soon as any difference between the second and first stimuli is 
detected).  
In short, the response-time data parallel the repetition suppression effects found in 
neuroimaging studies: when repeated stimuli are common, repeats evoke smaller neural responses 
and faster reaction times than novel stimuli; when repeats are rare, these effects diminish or 
disappear (compare the middle panel of Figure 10 with the bottom panels of Figure 1). Together, 
these data point to more efficient processing of repeated stimuli when those stimuli are more 
predictable. 
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General Discussion 
 
Empirical and theoretical treatments of the repetition effect on time perception have 
emphasized the idea that repeated stimuli are more expected than novel or rare items, and that this 
expectation compresses the subjective duration of repeats (e.g., Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2007; 
Matthews, 2011c; New & Scholl, 2009; Schindel et al., 2011; Tse et al., 2004; Seifried & Ulrich, 2010; 
Ulrich et al., 2006). Under this view, making repetitions more predictable by increasing the 
proportion of stimulus pairs for which the second item is a repeat of the first ought to exacerbate 
the subjective shortening of repeated stimuli. The present experiments found the opposite: 
increasing the repetition rate reduced, eliminated, and even reversed the usual shortening of 
subjective duration for repeated images. This held for face- and non-face photographs, across a 
range of durations, and occurred both when the second image in each pair was explicitly compared 
with the first and when the target image was simply judged on a categorical scale. Sequential effects 
analysis suggests that the effect is the result of trial-by-trial updating of expectations about 
repetition probabilities. The effect is primarily driven by a relative lengthening of repeated stimuli 
when repeats are common, and does not seem to be driven by changes in onset detection latency. 
These findings suggest that immediate repetition (that is, very recent prior exposure) and 
higher-order expectations about stimulus identity exert distinct effects on subjective time. On the 
one hand, recent exposure elicits a robust shortening of perceived duration relative to newer items. 
On the other, when repetition of the current item is highly predictable the subjective duration of its 
second occurrence is lengthened. That is, whereas previous accounts have posited that repeated 
stimuli have shorter apparent duration because they are expected, the current data suggest a more 
complex view: immediate repetition does shorten apparent duration when repetitions comprise 25% 
or 50% of the trials (and are therefore not especially expected), but making repetitions predictable 
increases the relative subjective duration of the repeated items.  
 
Prior exposure and repetition-expectation are functionally distinct 
Before relating the current data to theories of timing, it is worth considering some general 
implications.  Most discussions of repetition effects contrast two possibilities: such effects may be a 
low-level consequence of prior exposure, independent of expectations about forthcoming stimuli; or 
they may reflect implicit expectations about future experiences, in which case they will be 
strengthened when repeats become more common. There is evidence for both possibilities, but 
over-arching theories of cognition and neuroscience have emphasized the expectation-based 
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account (e.g., J.R. Anderson & Milson, 1989; Friston, 2005), and studies of neural repetition 
suppression have supported this view (e.g., Mayrhauser et al., 2014; Summerfield et al., 2008).  
The current data are a reminder that there is a third possibility: first-order repetition and 
second-order repetition frequency may have opposing effects. Finding this pattern does not, of 
course, negate the “hierarchical prediction machine” view of cognition (Clark, 2013), but it does 
provide an important qualification: one cannot assume functional equivalence between the effects 
of repetition and the effects of making repetition more predictable. This is important for any 
expectation-based view of repetition effects, irrespective of whether one posits a mechanism based 
on attention, arousal, size-of-neural-response, or something else. Moreover, this qualification poses 
a theoretical challenge because it is hard to see how opposing effects of immediate repetition and 
second-order repetition probability make optimal use of prior information to predict future events. 
What kind of environmental structure or past experience might lead to such a dissociation? Similarly, 
the opposing perceptual consequences of first-order repetition and second-order repetition 
probability mean that, if the predictive-coding view of brain organization is correct and the cortex 
does comprise a hierarchical series of prediction- and error-units, the functional consequences of 
error at early and later stages can nonetheless be quite distinct.  
 
Subjective time, expectation, and coding efficiency 
Turning to the specific topic of repetition effects in time perception, researchers have 
attributed the repetition effect to repeated stimuli being more expected and thus receiving less 
attention (Tse et al., 2004), taking longer to detect (Kim & McAuley, 2013), being less arousing (New 
& Scholl, 2009; Ulrich et al., 2006), or eliciting a smaller neural response (Matthews, 2011c; 
Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2007, 2012; Schindel et al., 2011). These (not necessarily exclusive) 
possibilities share the idea that repetition effects are a manifestation of implicit expectations. As 
such, while attention, preferential detection, and arousal may all play a role, these existing accounts 
cannot capture the pattern found here. 
The present findings are particularly relevant to the idea that the subjective duration of a 
stimulus is positively related to the magnitude of the neural response that it evokes (Eagleman & 
Pariyadath, 2009). The effect of repetition has been central to this argument because of the robust 
repetition suppression found in studies of evoked neural responses, and proponents of this view 
have emphasized the predictive coding conception of repetition suppression rather than low-level 
adaptation (Matthews, 2011c; Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2007, 2008, 2012; Schindel et al., 2011). That 
is, rare or novel stimuli are perceived to last longer because they evoke a larger prediction-error 
signal than “expected”, repeated items.  
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The current data do not, of course, directly challenge the idea that the brain is organized as a 
hierarchy of processing stages which successively “explain away” prediction error – especially given 
that there are multiple ways in which this predictive coding might be implemented (e.g., Friston, 
2009; Spratling, 2008). However, they do cast doubt on the idea of a simple correspondence 
between the overall evoked response magnitude and subjective time (see also Kononowicz and van 
Rijn, 2014). Neuroimaging has predominantly found a larger difference between repeated and non-
repeated stimuli when repeats are common, consistent with greater suppression for repeats when 
they are more predictable (e.g., Andics et al., 2013) or, in rare cases, have found repetition 
suppression that is unaffected by repetition probability (Kaliukhovic & Vogels, 2011; Kovács et al., 
2013). By contrast, I found a smaller difference between novel and repeated items as the repeats 
became more frequent. The difference between the neural and behavioural data is readily seen by 
comparing Figures 1 and 3.  
This dissociation cannot be confirmed without simultaneous recording of neural activity and 
temporal judgments. Nonetheless, the face stimuli used here are from databases used in the 
neuroimaging work, and the trial structure was similar to those studies. Moreover, the neural effects 
have generalized robustly: the effect is the same for faces, tones, and voices (e.g., Andics et al., 
2013; Summerfield et al., 2008; Todorovic & de Lange, 2012)  and, for face stimuli, is position 
invariant (Kovács et al., 2012); it has been replicated in studies using fMRI, EEG, and MEG, and across 
different brain regions and tasks (Larsson & Smith, 2012; Summerfield et al., 2011; Todorovic et al., 
2011). One obvious difference between the current experiments and the neuroimaging studies is 
that the former required temporal judgments; however, the neuroimaging results have generalized 
across tasks including monitoring face inversion, size changes, rotation, tone pitch and voice volume-
changes (Andics et al., 2013; Summerfield et al., 2008; Summerfield et al., 2011; Todorovic & De 
Lange, 2012); the time-perception effect similarly generalized across stimuli and tasks. This gives 
reasonable confidence that the difference is not due to a specific task demand or methodological 
quirk, but it will obviously be important to measure evoked responses in the duration-judgment task 
to test the dissociation suggested by the existing data. 
Even if one rejects a direct link between subjective duration and the overall magnitude of the 
evoked response, timing must ultimately be grounded in neural activity, and close inspection of the 
neural data reveals some consistency with the dissociable effects of immediate repetition and 
expectation on time perception. Kaliukhovic and Vogels (2011) found repetition suppression in 
macaque inferior temporal cortex to be unaffected by repetition rate; such expectation-independent 
suppression may be relevant to the current findings (see below). Similarly, human MEG recording by 
Todorovic and de Lange (2012) recently found that repeated auditory stimuli evoked smaller 
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responses than non-repeats early in processing (40-60 ms after onset) whereas expected stimuli 
evoked smaller responses than unexpected ones later in processing (100-200 ms post-onset), which 
the authors take to indicate a hierarchy of predictive coding, with early stages sensitive to local 
transition probabilities (i.e., repeat vs novel stimulus) and higher-level regularities coded later in the 
processing pathway (Friston, 2005; Kiebel, Daunizeau, & Friston, 2008; Wacongne et al., 2011). Thus, 
while subjective time may not be a simple consequence of the overall magnitude of the evoked 
response, it might be possible to establish correspondence between time perception and specific 
components of a predictive-coding hierarchy.  
 
Time perception as a function of the interplay between bottom-up and top-down processes 
Given that the effects of repetition and repetition-rate prove challenging for extant accounts, 
how are they to be explained?  Without committing to specific neural structures or 
implementations, perception is often conceptualized as involving a series of stages leading to 
progressively more integrated representations of the stimulus, with early stages representing basic 
features and later stages encoding higher-level conjunctions and, ultimately, object representations 
that support identification and semantic classification. These higher-level representations depend on 
an interaction between bottom-up sensory information and top-down modulation such as the 
attention-driven enhancement of relevant representations.  
One straightforward possibility is that subjective duration corresponds to the strength of the 
percept that results from this sequence of processing stages. “Strength” is used here in a general 
way, without affirming a specific neural implementation (e.g., the amplitude or rate of neural 
responses, or changes in the connectivity of neural networks). Rather, I am suggesting a broad 
information-processing framework in which subjective time depends on the transmission of sensory 
information to perceptual representations of the kind that support stimulus identification and 
classification. Correspondingly, manipulations which improve the accuracy/rate of perceptual 
decision-making will lengthen apparent duration. 
Within this framework, apparent duration will be modulated both by changes in the effective 
input signal and by top-down enhancement of relevant representations. The basic, compressive 
effect of stimulus repetition on apparent duration would then be an instance of the former, whereas 
the expansive effect of increasing the predictability of repeated stimuli would be a product of the 
latter. That is, very recent exposure to a stimulus will weaken the bottom-up signal strength and 
shorten apparent duration, but to the extent that a repeated item is expected there will be an 
opposing top-down enhancement of processing for the anticipated features, strengthening the 
percept and increasing both the efficiency of perceptual decision-making and the subjective duration 
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of the stimulus. Under this account, increasing the repetition rate will mean that recently-
encountered items are more expected, enhancing their perceptual processing and expanding their 
apparent duration. Evidence for such enhanced perceptual processing was found in Experiment 9, 
where gender categorization for repeated faces was faster when those repeats were more 
predictable; evidence for a corresponding increase in subjective duration was found in Experiments 
1, 2, 3, and 4a. 
Consistent with the bottom-up component of this framework, previous work has shown that 
subjective duration is lengthened when input is amplified by increases in stimulus magnitude (size, 
number, intensity, or contrast; e.g., Matthews et al., 2011; Xuan, Zhang, He, & Chen., 2007) – that is, 
by increases in the effective size/strength of the input signal. In contrast, adapting the sensory 
system to a particular stimulus feature weakens the effective input, suppressing the corresponding 
percept and shortening the duration of subsequent occurrences of that feature in the same location 
(e.g., Bruno et al., 2013; Burr et al., 2007). The locus of this modulation is debated, but the fact that 
it is spatiotopic confirms that it is not operating at the highest level of stimulus representation.  
The repetition effect studied in the present work was found in Experiments 5 and 6 to be short-
lived (dissipating after a 2-second ISI) and spatially-specific (repeating elements within a stimulus 
had no effect, whereas repeating them between successively-presented stimuli led to a contraction 
of apparent duration). These properties fit with the idea that repetition shortens subjective duration 
via adaptation at a relatively early stage in processing; indeed, the short time-course may suggest a 
basic biochemical process, such as fatigue/vesicle depletion among the relevant feature-sensitive 
neurons. Of course, the current experiments used presentations shorter than the prolonged 
exposures typical of adaptation studies, but this does not negate the idea of a reduction in effective 
input strength due to transient, perhaps spatiotopic diminished sensitivity at a relatively early stage 
of processing (but see Schindel et al., 2011, for evidence that the effect is not due to the very earliest 
stages of encoding, a conclusion further suggested by the absence of an onset-detection effect in the 
present Experiment 8). 
Turning to top-down modulation, prior studies have found that increasing a stimulus’ 
predictability (for example, by signalling its likely location or reducing uncertainty about when it will 
occur) improves information extraction (e.g., Bausenhart, Rolke, & Ulrich, 2007; Carrasco & McElree, 
2001; Yeshurun & Carrasco, 1998). Such signal-enhancement has been attributed to back-
projections from higher areas boosting the gain of relevant lower-level neurons (e.g., Reynolds, 
Pasternak, & Desimone, 2000; see Maunsell & Treue, 2006, for a review). Indeed, although 
predictive-coding theories emphasize inhibition of earlier areas by later ones, most back-projections 
are excitatory, amplifying responses for relevant features and locations (see Spratling, 2008, for a 
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reconciliation of this difference). Within the framework outlined above, such increases in gain should 
expand subjective time, and previous studies of time perception support the idea that these 
attention-based boosts to the strength of the percept correspond to increased apparent duration. 
Mattes and Ulrich (1998) cued the modality of forthcoming stimuli and found that their apparent 
duration lengthened as modality became more predictable. Similarly, Enns et al. (1999) found that 
the subjective duration of brief flashes was longer when they occurred in locations to which 
attention had been directed by arrow cues; endogenous cues (such as a bar flashed at the target 
location) produce the same effect (e.g., Seifried & Ulrich, 2011; Yeshurun & Marom, 2008), as does 
reducing uncertainty about when an item will be presented (e.g., Grondin & Rammsayer, 2003).  
Thus, although theorists have attributed the repetition effect in time perception to repeated 
stimuli being more expected, studies of attention suggest that predictability actually prolongs 
apparent duration. From this perspective, making the identity of repeated stimuli more predictable 
by increasing the repetition rate will lengthen the apparent duration of those stimuli because higher-
level expectations will amplify relevant earlier-stage representations. Moreover, this increase in gain 
will produce superior high-level representations of the stimuli, supporting better 
perceptual/semantic decision-making. Both the prolonged apparent duration and the improved 
semantic classification for predictable repeats were found in the current experiments. 
In this framework, increasing the repetition rate will boost the gain for recently-encountered 
features and reduce the perceptual strength of unexpected, novel stimuli. Given the large number of 
features making up a given image, the enhancement will be for a relatively small portion of the 
feature space while the decrease will be more diffuse. Correspondingly, we would expect a large 
increase for the repeated items and a smaller reduction for any given novel stimulus. The present 
research has focused on the difference between judgments of novel and repeated stimuli rather 
than on whether changes in this difference are driven by the responses to novel or repeated items. 
However, the contrast plots suggest that the reduced repetition effect is primarily due to increases 
in the subjective duration of repeats, although there seems to be some reduction in the apparent 
duration of novel items, too. Interpreting this pattern is problematic because the relativity of 
judgment means that responses are a function of the difference between percepts, not a direct 
window on their “absolute” subjective magnitude (e.g., Stewart, Brown, & Chater, 2005; Stewart & 
Matthews, 2009). For example, even if repetition frequency only affected the perceived duration of 
repeated items, it may still change the judgments for both repeated and novel images. Nonetheless, 
the large effect of repetition frequency for repeated items and the smaller change for novel ones is 
consistent with the framework outlined here.  
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Possible implementations 
The foregoing provides a general framework. I have outlined possible neural bases for the 
component processes, but the core idea that subjective time is a positive function of the strength of 
perceptual representation, which in turn depends on an interplay between bottom-up input-
strength and top-down gain control, does not assume a particular neural mechanism. As such, this 
information-processing approach does not predict a straightforward relation between subjective 
duration and the overall size of the response evoked by the stimulus (cf. the coding efficiency view 
described above); rather, it predicts that factors which improve perceptual processing (i.e., those 
which improve the accuracy and rate of perceptual decision-making) will prolong apparent duration. 
Nonetheless, it is worth considering how this framework might be related to current mechanistic 
models of timing. 
Many accounts assume that the raw material of temporal perception is the pulses or counts 
emitted by an internal pacemaker, whose accumulation begins and ends with stimulus onset/offset 
and whose total number provides the measure of elapsed time (e.g., Gibbon et al., 1984; Treisman, 
1963; Wearden, 1992; Zakay & Block, 1997; for a general treatment see Rammsayer and Ulrich, 
2001). Some theories identify these pulses with neural firing, but they are often an abstract 
construct. Crucially, despite the dedicated nature of the putative pacemaker, its rate has been taken 
to be influenced by a panoply of non-temporal variables, including intensity, modality, motion, 
emotionality and, as we have discussed, novelty (Droit-Volet & Gil, 2009; Matthews, 2011a, b; 
Matthews et al., 2011; New and Scholl, 2009; Ulrich et al., 2006; Wearden, Edwards, Fakhri, & 
Percival, 1998). This lability is a strange feature for a dedicated timing device, and no centralized 
pulse-emitter has yet been found.  
One straightforward possibility is that the pulses of the pacemaker correspond to the activity 
associated with high-level stimulus representations, those at the end of the sequence of perceptual 
processing stages. This might entail counting neural spikes, but metrics based on other changes in 
cortical networks might serve the same function (Mauk and Buonomano, 2004). In any case, the idea 
that the “pacemaker-pulses” correspond to the activity associated with the formation of high-level 
stimulus representations may explain why so many non-temporal features affect the effective rate 
of the putative pacemaker. 
A related framework attributes timing to cortical oscillators whose periods are synchronized at 
stimulus onset; thereafter, the subset of oscillators with coincident activity provides a measure of 
elapsed time. The striatal beat-frequency model provides one version of this idea, attributing 
different components of the model (which can be mapped on to those of the pacemaker-
accumulator framework) to specific neural structures (Buhusi and Meck, 2005; Matell and Meck, 
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2004; Merchant et al., 2013). Importantly, recent work has emphasized the links between timing and 
high-level stimulus representations: the neuroanatomical structures underlying timing largely 
overlap with those of working memory, and the same neural representation (namely, cortical 
oscillations) may encode information about both stimulus identity and stimulus duration (Gu, van 
Rijn, & Meck, in press; Lustig, Matell, & Meck, 2005; van Rijn, Gu, and Meck, in press). By linking 
timing to high-level representations of stimulus identity, and by emphasizing the links between 
peripheral and central processes (Merchant et al., 2008, 2013), the beat-frequency model may 
provide a framework for incorporating the information processing account outlined here. 
 
Conclusions and future directions 
The present research suggests opposing effects on subjective time of prior exposure and higher-
order expectations, with the former producing a robust contraction and the latter producing a 
relative expansion for repeated items. This general point is important for cognitive and 
neuroscientific theories that posit unitary effects of first and second order expectations. The data 
are problematic for extant accounts of repetition effects on timing, but can be accommodated 
within a framework in which subjective duration is positively related to the strength of perceptual 
representations of the type that support stimulus identification and classification, and which 
therefore depend on low-level changes in the effective input signal and the amplification of this 
signal by top-down expectations. These findings suggest a number of directions for future work.  
  First, it will be important to see whether the opposing effects of repetition and repetition-
expectation found here arise for other perceptual judgments. Relatedly, it will be interesting to 
consider adaptive explanations for this pattern, based on environmental contingencies or pre-
experimental experiences, such that it could be incorporated within the increasingly prevalent view 
of the mind as a Bayesian optimizer. 
Second, the apparently divergent effects of repetition probability on time perception and on 
neural response magnitude urges an experiment which manipulates repetition probability whilst 
recording neural activity trial-by-trial and examines the relation between these responses and 
subjective duration.  
Third, given the importance of discrimination accuracy to theories of timing (e.g., Grondin, 
2012; Matthews & Grondin, 2012; Rammsayer & Ulrich, 2001), it will be important to establish how 
repetition and repetition probability affect this measure. The current findings generalized across 
image types, meaning that it should be possible to harvest sufficient stimuli to permit estimation of 
the psychometric function.  
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Fourth, it will be instructive to employ non-repeated stimuli that are nonetheless perfectly 
predictable. In the present work, non-repeats were always completely new and unpredictable, but 
one could have contingencies such that (for example) stimulus A is always followed by B whereas C is 
equally likely to be followed by D or E, further illuminating the contributions of repetition and 
expectation. Likewise, many studies have employed an oddball paradigm where the same standards 
and oddballs are used across trials (that is, oddballs are rare rather than strictly novel). Varying the 
prevalence of particular standards and oddballs throughout the experiment could disambiguate the 
contributions of repetition, frequency, and genuine novelty. 
Fifth, the roles of intra-stimulus repetition and complexity demand further scrutiny. The present 
Experiment 6 suggests that a “boring” stimulus comprising repeated elements is judged no 
differently from an “interesting”, heterogeneous item, but other work has found that complexity 
does affect the apparent duration of tone and light sequences (e.g., Aubry, Guillaume, Mogicato, 
Bergeret, & Celsis, 2008; Matthews, 2013; Schiffman & Bobko, 1974) and the effects of complexity 
may depend on whether the participant has to process the non-temporal structure of the stimulus 
(e.g., Varakin, Klemes, & Porter, 2013).  
Sixth, it will be important to clarify the types of expectations which module the repetition 
effect. Variations in repetition rate produced functionally-important shifts in implicit predictions 
based on trial-by trial updating of expectancies, but there was no effect of verbally signalling 
whether the next pair of items would be the same or different. This may suggest a difference 
between “implicit” perceptual predictions, which prolong subjective duration, and the effects of 
explicit cues, which may require higher-level intentional orienting or perceptual anticipation and 
which do not automatically entail an expansion of apparent time. 
Finally, it would be useful to investigate the processing levels at which repetition can influence 
subjective time. Prior work has focused on the repetition of perceptual features, but studies of 
priming routinely find that semantic relations between the first and second stimulus are sufficient to 
moderate processing (e.g., Neely, 1991); is there a similar semantic-repetition effect on time 
perception?  
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Table 1. Means and standard deviations of judgments for each condition of Experiment 3. 
 
  
 Low rep-rate 
 High rep-rate 
Duration novel repeat 
 novel repeat 
906 ms 
949.14 
(SD = 73.76) 
950.6 
(SD = 83.87) 
 
942.46 
(SD = 73.06) 
955.29 
(SD = 68.06) 
1000 ms 
994.97 
(SD = 57.99) 
1001.79 
(SD = 73.29) 
 
989.09 
(SD = 70) 
1008.93 
(SD = 62.88) 
1094 ms 
1048.02 
(SD = 52.73) 
1033.12 
(SD = 70.11) 
 
1039.68 
(SD = 72.5) 
1038.89 
(SD = 63.42) 
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Figure 1. The top panels show the predicted magnitude of evoked responses to novel and repeated 
stimuli when repetitions are rare (low rep-rate) and common (high rep-rate). The left panel indicates 
the pattern if repetition suppression is purely due to prior exposure to the stimulus; the right panel 
illustrates the predictions if repetition suppression is due to higher-order expectations. The bottom 
left panel plots data from Summerfield et al. (2008), showing neural responses in fusiform face area 
to novel and repeated faces. Repetition suppression is much more pronounced when repetitions are 
common/predictable, showing that the effect reflects expectations/predictive coding rather than 
just low-level adaptation. The bottom right panel plots similar results from a study by Kovács et al. 
(2012); the pattern has been replicated many times elsewhere.  
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Figure 2. Sequence of events on each trial of Experiment 1. On repeat trials, the two faces were the 
same; on novel trials they were different. 
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Figure 3. Results from Experiments 1, 2a, and 2b. The left panels show the mean responses in each 
condition: novel stimuli were judged longer than repeats, but this effect diminished when repeats 
were more common – the opposite of the effect on neural activity (see Figure 1). The right panels 
show the pairwise contrasts with 95% confidence intervals: the first two points show the difference 
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between novel and repeated stimuli for the low and high rep-rate conditions; the next two points 
show the effect of changing the rep-rate on judgments of novel and repeated stimuli. 
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Figure 4. Results from Experiment 3. The left panel plots the mean judgments in each condition; the 
right panel shows pairwise contrasts with 95% confidence intervals, as before. 
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Figure 5: Results from Experiments 4a and 4b. The left hand panels show the mean responses for 
each condition; the right panels show the pairwise contrasts with 95% confidence intervals. 
Experiment 4a replicates the pattern found in previous experiments; Experiment 4b shows no effect 
of repetition or repetition frequency. 
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Figure 6. An example of the abstract stimuli used in Experiments 5 and 6. In Experiment 5, each 
stimulus was produced by sampling 9 different icons from a pool of 75. On novel trials, the first and 
second stimuli on each trial were different. In Experiment 6, “complex” stimuli were constructed in 
the same way as in Experiment 5; “simple” stimuli were constructed by repeating the same icon 9 
times in the 3x3 grid.  
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Figure 7. Results of Experiment 5. The left panel shows the mean proportion of trials on which the 
comparison stimulus was judged to last longer than the standard as a function of whether the image 
was a repeat or novel and whether the ISI was short (306 ms) or long (2000 ms). The right panel 
shows the contrasts, with 95% confidence intervals (S = short ISI; L = long ISI). 
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Figure 8. Results of Experiment 7. The left panels show the mean judgments for each condition; the 
right panels show the pairwise contrasts with 95% confidence intervals. “Valid” trials began with a 
cue that perfectly predicted whether or not the forthcoming faces would be identical. On “invalid” 
trials, the cue that preceded the face pair conveyed no information about repetition. 
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Figure 9. Sequential effects in Experiment 1. The left panels show the mean judgments as a function 
of the current image (novel or repeat) and the preceding trial-type (prev-nov = on the previous trial, 
the comparison stimulus was novel; prev-rep = on the previous trial, the comparison stimulus was a 
repeat of the standard). The right panels show the contrasts with 95% confidence intervals. In these 
plots, PN = previous trial was novel; PR = previous trial was a repeat. (Thus, for example, PR: nov-rep 
indicates the difference between novel and repeat stimuli on the current trial when the previous 
trial was a repeat. Likewise, novel: PR-PN indicates the difference between judgments of novel 
stimuli on the current trial when the previous trial was a repeat vs judgments of novel stimuli on the 
current trial when the previous trial was novel). 
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Figure 10. Results of Experiments 8 and 9, showing mean responses (left panels) and pairwise 
contrasts with 95% confidence intervals (right panels). The top row shows the results from the 
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onset-detection task of Experiment 8. The middle row shows how gender classification responses for 
repeated images become faster as the repetition rate increases. The bottom row shows that this 
effect is specific to trials where the second image is identical to the first, and does not generalize to 
novel faces of the same gender-- arguing against a pure response-preparation account.  
